In this paper a conditional logic is defined and studied. This conditional logic, DmBL, is constructed as close as possible to the Bayesian and is unrestricted, that is one is able to use any operator without restriction. A notion of logical independence is also defined within the logic itself. This logic is shown to be non trivial and is not reduced to classical propositions. A model is constructed for the logic. Completeness results are proved. It is shown that any unconditioned probability can be extended to the whole logic DmBL. The Bayesian is then recovered from the probabilistic DmBL. At last, it is shown why DmBL is compliant with Lewis triviality.
Introduction
This work originates from a contribution to the book of Dezert and Smarandache [1] about the DSmT, a theory related to the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. Evidence Theory [2] is a theoretical and practical tool for manipulating non deterministic informations. In particular, it is used for fusing information. Among other non deterministic theories, Evidence Theory is considered by some as a possible alternative to the Bayesian Probability.
A question then arises. Why using a theory instead another theory? This question implies another sub-question: what is the logic behind a non deterministic theory? For example, when is known the logic behind the DSmT or the Bayesian Probability, then it may be possible to make a comparison between these two theories. It has been shown in [1, 3] that such a logic can be found for the DSmT (it was a multi-Modal logic). This paper is the development of a similar work about the Bayesian rule, which beginnings are found in [3] . A future work will be certainly a joint logical study of these theories.
There are several existing logical characterizations of the Bayesian Probability. First should be mentioned Cox's axiomatic derivation of the Bayesian probability ( [4] but also [5, 6] ). On the other hand, the theory of Probabilistic Logic [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] explains how probabilities and the probabilistic Bayesian rule could be an approach for reasoning with uncertain propositions. An orthogonal viewpoint consists in defining a logic or an algebra of conditionals, and then consider their possible probabilistic extensions. This is the domain of conditional logics [12, 13, 14] or of Conditional Event Algebras [15, 16, 17, 18] ; in particular, the CEAs described in [15, 16] make possible some enrichment of the Bayesian rules. By the way, it is known that the construction of a conditional logic/algebra is strongly constrained by Lewis result [19] , which has shown some critical issues related to the notion of conditional probability; refer also to [20, 21, 22] . In particular, Lewis result implies strong hypotheses about the nature of the conditionals. In most cases, the conditionals have to be constructed outside the space of unconditioned propositions. Such constraints are apparent in the model constructed in [16] . Whatever, an escape to Lewis, may be to restrict the construction of the conditionals to unconditioned propositions only [16] . Closure of the conditionals are proposed for several CEAs, but some undesired properties come out [15] .
In this paper, a conditional logic is defined, with the purpose to be closely related to a Bayesian reasoning (notice that [16] gives an example of conditional algebra very close to the Bayesian). Moreover this logic is constructed so as to be closed for the conditionals. This closure makes possible the definition and use of the notion of logical independence within the logic. It is shown that the logical independence have several logical consequences; independence properties are derived. At last, the Bayesian probability is recovered from these logical properties and the probabilistic extension of DmBL. As a final result, a theorem is proved that guarantees the existence of an extension of any probability over classical proposition onto DmBL (Lewis result is thus avoided). As will be shown along the paper, DmBL does not add notable properties to the already existing CEA , at the unconditioned level. But its main interest is to illustrate the logical behavior of the conditional closure.
Section 2 is dedicated to the definition of the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic. The languages, axioms and rules are introduced, followed by an informal discussion of the definition.
In section 3, several theorems of the logic are derived. A discussion about Lewis' negative result is opened here. A purely logical viewpoint is considered in this section.
A model for DmBL is constructed in section 4. A partial completeness theorem is derived.
The extension of probabilities over DmBL is investigated in section 5. The (probabilistic) Bayesian rule is recovered from the probabilistic extension of the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic. It is explained why our construction avoids Lewis' negative result.
The paper is then concluded.
Some comparisons of our model and logic with existing works are done after the definition, the logical theorems, the model construction (in appendix) and the probability extension.
Definition of the logics
DmBL was first defined as DBL (Deterministic Bayesian Logic) without modality in a previous version of this document [23] . The non modal definition is really harsh and uneasy to handle/understand. For this new modal definition, I have been inspired by the seminal work of Lewis [12] , and also by more recent works of Laura Giordano and al, which use the modality for specifying the conditional behavior [13, 14] . In the following, the definition of DmBL is also based on an interaction with the modality. As will be discussed later, the modality is mainly instrumental and the interaction is implicit in DmBL.
The Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic is defined subsequently. It is an extension of the modal logic T , alias System T , which definition is recalled. In the definition of DmBL, the modal operator 2 plays the role of a logical tool, for discriminating a proposition from the knowledge we have of it.
Language. Let Θ = {θ i /i ∈ I} be a set of atomic propositions.
The language L C of the classical logic related to Θ is the smallest set such that:
The language L T of the modal logic T related to Θ is the smallest set such that:
The language L of the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic related to Θ is the smallest set such that:
The operator × describes the logical independence between propositions. The operators × and (|) are conjointly defined. In the sequel, the notation φ ↔ ψ is an abreviation for
Rules and axioms. The classical Logic C is characterized by the Modus ponens and the classical axioms c * described subsequently. The modal Logic T is characterized by the Modus ponens, the classical axioms c * and the modal rule/axioms m * described subsequently (c.f. also [24] ). The Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic , i.e. DmBL, is characterized by the Modus ponens, the classical axioms c * , the modal rule/axioms m * and the Bayesian axioms b * :
Customized axioms. Axioms introduced for the specification of a particular sub-theory of DmBL. In particular the customized axioms may be used to characterize the properties of the atomic propositions: axioms like ⊢ θ i , ⊢ ¬2θ i and ⊢ θ i × θ j are possible.
Customized axioms will not be considered in this paper.
DmBL * , a weakened version of DmBL, is defined by replacing b6 by the alternative axioms:
The symbols ⊢ C , ⊢ T and ⊢ will be used to denote a proof in C, T or DmBL/DmBL * respectively.
Discussion. First at all, let us discuss the role of the modality. Notice that the modality is only instrumental for us: there exists a non modal definition of DmBL, called DBL, defined in a previous version [23] . This property will be confirmed in section 4, when is constructed a Kripke model of DmBL * complete for the non modal propositions (including the conditionals). This Kripke model is based on a full accessibility relation (i.e. R = W 2 ); full accessibility indeed reduces the modality to something trivially contrasted . Now, the role of 2 here is to infer a modal-like definition of the conditional (|) . More precisely, the fundamental axiom b1: ⊢ 2(φ → ψ) → 2¬φ ∨ 2(ψ|φ) , should be compared to its non modal version in DBL [23] , that is
which is clearly a modal-like definition. But b1.old is really uneasy to handle (what is a proof with such multivalued rule?), while working at the modal level with b1 is really quiet. Now, it is interesting to compare our axiomatization with previously existing axiomatization of the conditionals.
Typically, we will consider the axioms of VCU [12] , p.132. I guess that this comparison will make apparent some specific differences of DmBL. Notice that this comparison will also rely on logical theorems derived subsequently in section 3 , or from rather easy deductions:
which is a part of the inference theorem.
(Ax.6) (¬φ2→ φ) → ¬(¬φ2→ φ)2→ (¬φ2→ φ) becomes ⊢ (φ|¬φ) → (φ|¬φ) ¬(φ|¬φ) (derived from theorem.) (CR) Counterfactual rule. This rule is a multiple-task rule! First, it allows the introduction of tautologies inside a conditional, secondly, it implies some linearity of the conditional with ∧ :
. This rule becomes in DmBL:
As a first conclusion, it happens that Ax.2, Ax.4, Ax.5, Ax.6 and CR are recovered in DmBL, Ax.1 is partially recovered, and Ax.3 is not derived from DmBL. In fact, the axiom Ax.3 is replaced in DmBL by a strong axiom dedicated to the negation, i.e. b4. It will be seen that the weakening of Ax.1 is forced by the axiom b4 of DmBL. Otherwise, some conflicts will focus on the empty proposition ⊥.
Now, let discuss precisely about the specific axioms of DmBL.
In VCU, there is a rule, CR, for the introduction of tautologies inside a conditional. DmBL contains this rule. But in DmBL, the introduction of "tautologies" (in fact 2-ed propositions) in the conditional is done more specifically by b1.
• b1 manages the "tautologies" more precisely. While CR (simplified) maps the tautology ξ → ψ onto the tautology (φ2→ ξ) → (φ2→ ψ) , b1 maps 2(φ → ψ) onto 2(ψ|φ) : i.e. the proposition ψ could be considered within the range φ,
• But the mapping of b1 is always weakened by the output 2¬φ .
Axiom b3 is the same as Ax.4.
Axiom b2 has no equivalent in VCU. However, b2 could be deduced from b4 and (ψ ∧ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ) . Now, it is proved (φ2→ (ψ ∧ η)) ↔ ((φ2→ ψ) ∧ (φ2→ η)) in VCU. In other words, b2 does not make a true difference with VCU. The crucial difference thus comes with b4.
Axioms like b4 does not exist in VCU. This axiom changes fundamentally the nature of the conditional: the sub-universe associated to a conditional becomes classical. By classical, we mean that (ψ ∧ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ) and (¬ψ|φ) ≡ ¬(ψ|φ) (these properties are proved in the next section). Now, it is remembered that axioms like b4 have not been included in VCU, because it implied some conflict with the other axioms/rule. This conflict is particularly focused over the empty proposition ⊥ . More precisely, it is deduced ⊥2 → ⊥ by Ax.1. By CR and ⊥ → ⊤, it is deduced (⊥2→ ⊥) → (⊥2→ ⊤) , and finally (⊥2→ ⊥) ∧ (⊥2→ ⊤) . If we apply a rule like b4, it is obtained
In order to avoid such conflict in DmBL, the ⊥ is considered as an exception in the rule b1, which results in the weakening of the mapping b1 by the proposition 2¬φ .
Axiom b5 and b6 introduce quite new notions, in comparison with VCU. But I do not have elements for comparison. It is possible that b5 and b6 do not imply fundamental differences with VCU.
Conclusion: in comparison with VCU, DmBL improves the manipulation of the negation within the conditional, and thus implies a classical behavior of the sub-universes related to a conditioning (c.f. Sub-universes are classical in next section). As a consequence, it is necessary to introduce a relaxation in comparison with the rules of VCU, in particular around the empty proposition: ⊥ should be considered as a singularity. By manipulating the negation that way, DmBL is closer to "Bayesian" algebras (like for example the Conditional Events Algebra defined in [16] ; we will discuss this model later) than could be the VCU . Moreover, DmBL is not restricted in the use of the conditionals (contrary to the CEA), and a notion of logical independence is constructed within the logic. The following section studies the logical consequences of such axiomatization.
It is similarly proved
Now it has been shown ⊢ 2¬φ → 2 (Ξ|φ) ↔ Ξ , and considering Ξ = ψ, η or φ ∧ η, it
The second theorem is then proved.
Third theorem is a consequence of the first and second theorems.
Last theorem is a consequence of the first and third theorems.
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Evaluating (⊤|·) and (⊥|·) [b6.weak.A]. Is proved ⊢ 2ψ → 2(ψ|φ) . In particular (⊤|φ) ≡ ⊤ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ .
Proof. From ⊢ 2ψ → 2(φ → ψ) and b1, it comes ⊢ 2ψ → 2¬φ ∨ 2(ψ|φ) . Now ⊢ 2¬φ → 2 (ψ|φ) ↔ ψ , and consequently ⊢ 2ψ → 2(ψ|φ) .
Inference property.
Introspection. ⊢ 2¬φ ∨ 2(φ|φ) .
Interpretation: a non empty proposition sees itself as ever true. Notice that this property is compliant with (⊥|⊥) ≡ ⊥ .
Proof. Obvious from ⊢ φ → φ and b1 .
Inter
Interpretation: a proposition is independent of its sub-universe.
Proof. It is proved:
Proof. First theorem comes from the deduction:
The second theorem is also derived from similar deductions:
Now, let prove the third theorem.
The Left equivalence property implies
Interpretation: a propositions independent with itself is either full or empty.
Proof.
.
Independence and proof [b6.
Interpretation: when propositions are independent and their disjunctions are sure, then at least one proposition is sure.
Independence and regularity [b6.weak.A].
Interpretation: unless it is empty, a proposition may be removed from a logical equation, when it appears in the both sides and is independent with the equation components.
Proof. It is easy to prove 
Corollary 2.
Being given ψ and φ such that ⊢ 3φ, the proposition (ψ|φ) is uniquely defined as the solution of equation X ∧ φ ≡ ψ ∧ φ (with unknown X) which is independent of φ.
This uniqueness is fake however, since the definition of × depends on (|).
Proof. Let hypothesize ⊢ X × φ and ⊢ 3φ.
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Propositions equivalences [b6]. ⊢ 2(ψ ↔ η) → 2 (φ|ψ) ↔ (φ|η) (proved with b6 but without b6.weak.B).
Interpretation: equivalence is compliant with the conditioning.
Proof. First notice that all previous properties are obtained without b6.weak.B, and are thus obtained from b6.
Applying the regularity, it comes
, thus completing the proof.
Corollary. Axiom b6 implies b6.weak.B. In particular, DmBL * is weaker than DmBL.
Corollary of b6 or b6.weak.B. ψ ≡ η implies (φ|ψ) ≡ (φ|η).
Together with the properties of the system T and left equivalences, this last result implies that the equivalence relation ≡ is compliant with the logical operators of DmBL/DmBL * . In particular, replacing a sub-proposition with an equivalent sub-proposition within a theorem still makes a theorem.
Interpretation: the Markov property holds, when the conditioning is independent of the past and the past is possible.
τ =1 φ τ , the proof is achieved by applying the regularity. 222
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This is a quite limited result, and it is tempting to assume the additional but controversial
There is a really critical point here. A main argument against Bayesian propositions relies on Lewis' negative result . This result will be explained later, when speaking about probabilities. It will be shown that Lewis' negative result does not hold with DmBL. However this becomes false with ( * ), and actually axiom ( * ) implies a strictly logical counterpart to Lewis :
Interpretation: if φ and ψ are not exclusive and not equivalent, then they are independent. This is irrelevant and forbids the use of axiom ( * ).
Proof. Since ¬(φ → ψ) ≡ φ ∧ ¬ψ , it is equivalent to prove:
Since × is symmetric, it is sufficient to prove
by applying axiom ( * ), (ψ|φ)
Some comparisons with CEA. It is interesting to compare our logical results with what is obtained in Conditional Event Algebra. There are different possible CEA, but we will restrict our discussion to the DGNW and later to the Product Space CEA [15] . In appendix D it will also be discussed about the Product Space CEA [15, 16] , by a comparison with the conditional model of DmBL * .
The classical nature of the sub-universes are a common value for the CEAs and DmBL. Now, DGNW introduces some new equivalences, which are not in DmBL:
Owing to the free model constructed in next section, it is likely that these equivalences will need some additional axioms in DmBL. Another interesting difference is noticed for the conditioning. While DGNW provides:
Besides, DmBL allows the trivial conditioning to be removed, i.e. (φ|⊤) ≡ φ, while (a|Ω) = a is not allowed in DGNW. About the Product Space CEA, the answer is less clear since [16] removes it, while [15] does not. In will be discussed more precisely about this question in section 5, when considering Lewis's triviality. A last point is about the closure of DGNW. It is proposed in [15] :
But this definition fails to satisfy the intuitive relation:
It is proved in section 5 that the probabilistic extension of DmBL verifies this property.
Models

Toward a Model
In this paragraph, it is discussed about the link between Kripke models for DmBL/DmBL * and a more basic structure called conditional models.
and verifying:
• H(φ) = W for any φ such that ⊢ φ is an axiom of the form m3, b1, b2, b3, b4, or b6 (respectively b6.weak.A and b6.weak.B).
Notice that the rules and axioms c * , modus ponens, m1 and m2 and are compliant with the model by construction. m4 and b5 are just definitions.
and verifying:
• M is a Boolean sub-algebra of P(W ), i.e. A∩B ∈ M and W \A ∈ M for any A, B ∈ M ,
Such model does not implement the modalities.
Remark: in both models, the function f is the representation of the conditional (|) .
Model transfer. Let (W, M, h, f ) be a conditional model for DmBL (respectively DmBL * ). Let R = W × W and define H by:
Then (W, R, H, f ) is a Kripke model for DmBL (respectively DmBL * ).
Proof. First notice that the above construction of H is possible for any proposition φ ∈ L, since it is always obtained
is actually a Kripke model. Let verify the compliance with m3, b1, b2, b3, b4 and b6 (resp. b6.weak. * ).
Compliance with m3 is obtained from the fact that R is reflexive.
and H(φ) = ∅ , and f H(ψ), H(φ) = W by using β1.
e. compliance with b6.
As a consequence, H 2 (ψ|φ) ↔ ψ = H 2 (φ|ψ) ↔ φ and the result.
e. compliance with b6.weak.A.
As a consequence, H 2 (ψ|φ) ↔ ψ = H 2 (ψ|¬φ) ↔ ψ and the result.
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Conditional models are defined from the classical and conditional operators only. In fact, they have been set first for a non modal construction of the Bayesian logic [23] , and were complete in this case. It appears that conditional models are translated into DmBL/DmBL * Kripke models. The derived models are of course not complete for DmBL/DmBL * , but are sufficient to prove that the conditional operator cannot be reduced to trivialities.
Moreover, the model transfer property also suggests that the conditional operator is not constructed from the modal operator: it is even possible to construct (|) when 2 is trivial in
In this paper a free conditional model is constructed for DmBL * , with some completeness results. In section 5 a model for DmBL will be also derived but not constructed. This model of DmBL will be non trivial, but no completeness result will be derived.
Construction of a free conditional model for DmBL *
In the sequel, Θ is assumed to be finite. A free conditional model for DmBL * will be constructed as a limit of partial models. These models are constructed recursively, based on the iteration of (|) on any propositions.
Definition of partial models
In this section are constructed a sequence (Ω n , M n , h n , f n , Λ n ) n∈IN and a sequence of one-toone morphisms (µ n ) n∈IN such that:
• M n is a Boolean sub-algebra of P(Ω n ), h n : Θ → M n and f n : M n × M n → M n , (f n will be partially defined)
e. µ n is a Boolean morphism) and ∀θ ∈ Θ, h n+1 (θ) = µ n h n (θ) ,
• Λ n is a list of elements of M n , which is used as a task list of the construction (refer to the subsequent paragraphs.).
Remark. The functions f n represent the partial construction of (|) . The morphisms µ n characterize the "inclusion" of the partial models.
In a subsequent section, a conditional model Ω ∞ , M ∞ , h ∞ , f ∞ will be defined as the limit of (Ω n , M n , h n , f n ) n∈IN associated to (µ n ) n∈IN .
Notations and definitions. For any
Any singleton {ω} may be denoted ω if the context is not ambiguous.
For any m > n and A ∈ M n , it is defined
The Cartesian product of sets A and B is denoted A × B ; the functions id and T are defined over pairs by id(x, y) = (x, y) and T (x, y) = (y, x) .
• Ω 0 = {0, 1} Θ ,
Step n to step n + 1.
and the one-to-one morphisms (µ k ) 0≤k≤n−1 be constructed.
Notice that λ n (s n ) =∼ λ n (s n + 1) by construction of Λ n . Define b n = λ n (s n ) . Then, construct the set I n and the sequences Γ n (i), Π n (i)| i∈In according to the cases:
Case
for any (ω, ω ′ ) ∈ I n . † † Remark: case 0 means that the construction of f (·, b n ) and of f (·, ∼ b n ) has already begun over the propositions of M ν+1 . Case 1. Case 0 does not hold; Define I n = {b n } , Π n (i) = i and Γ n (i) =∼ i for any i ∈ I n .
Remark: case 1 means that f (·, b n ) and f (·, ∼ b n ) are constructed for the first time.
Setting. (Ω n+1 , M n+1 , h n+1 , f n+1 , Λ n+1 ) and µ n are defined by:
• ∀θ ∈ Θ, h n+1 (θ) = µ n h n (θ) ,
• Λ n+1 = (s n+1 , f n+1 , λ n+1 ) is such that:
This definition ensures a cyclic and full construction of f (·, b n ) and f (·, ∼ b n ).
1
The first steps of the model construction are illustrated by a simple example in appendix D. Appendix D also compares this construction with the Product Space CEA of [16] ; this comparison involves a discussion about the logical independence.
Properties of
It is proved recursively:
• µ n : M n → M n+1 is a one-to-one Boolean morphism,
Proofs are given in appendix A
Limit
The limit Ω ∞ , M ∞ , h ∞ , f ∞ is defined as follows:
Useful definitions:
It is noticed that this mapping is invariant with µ, i.e. (A [m]
• Let A, B ∈ M ∞ . Then there is n and a, b ∈ M n such that A = a ∞ , B = b ∞ and
This definition is justified by the following propositions:
Proof. By definition of Ω ∞ and since the µ k | k∈IN are one-to-one Boolean morphism:
Proposition 2. M n:∞ is a Boolean subalgebra of P(Ω ∞ ) and is isomorph to M n by the morphism A → A ∞ .
Proof is obvious from the definition of M n:∞ .
From now on, M n will be considered as a subalgebra of P(Ω ∞ ).
Proposition 3. Let A, B ∈ M ∞ . Then there is n and a, b ∈ M n such that A = a ∞ , B = b ∞ and f n (b, a) is defined. 
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Proposition 5. Ω ∞ , M ∞ , h ∞ , f ∞ verifies β1, β2, β3, β4 and β6w.
The properties β * are inherited from M n , f n | n∈IN , by means of the propertiesβ * . 
Implied Kripke model for DmBL
Partial Completeness
It is above the scope of this work to construct a complete model for DmBL * . However, it is shown here that B is sufficiently complete to characterize the operator (|) in DmBL * . Proof is done in appendix B .
Proposition 1. By construction, (Ω ∞
,
Coherence properties
The model B clearly shows that DmBL * is coherent. It also demonstrates that the conditional operator (|) is not trivial. Since (Ω ∞ , H B ) is a complete model for C, DmBL * is also an extension of the classical logic: ⊢ φ implies ⊢ C φ. But a stronger property holds:
Non distortion. Let φ be a classical proposition. Assume that ⊢ 2φ ∨ 2¬φ in DmBL * . Then ⊢ C φ or ⊢ C ¬φ. 
is a complete Boolean model for C , which implies ⊢ C φ or ⊢ C ¬φ .
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Another non distortion property will be derived subsequently, by the probabilistic extension. Probabilities are classically defined over measurable sets. However, this is only a manner to model the notion of probability, which is essentially an additive measure of the belief of logical propositions [10] . Probability could be defined without reference to the measure theory, at least when the propositions are countable. The notion of probability is explained now within a strict propositional formalism. Conditional probabilities are excluded from this definition, but the notion of independence is considered.
Intuitively, a probability over a set of logical propositions is a measure of belief which is additive (disjoint propositions are adding their chances) and increasing with the propositions. This measure should be zeroed for the ever-false propositions and full for the ever-true propositions. Moreover, a probability is a multiplicative measure for independent propositions. These intuitions are now formalized.
Definition for classical propositions. A probability π over C is a IR + valued function such that for any proposition φ and ψ of L C :
Property. The coherence and additivity implies the increase of π:
Proof. Since φ ≡ C (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ¬ψ) and (φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (φ ∧ ¬ψ) ≡ C ⊥, the additivity implies:
From the coherence π(⊥) = 0 , it is deduced π(φ) = π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∧ ¬ψ) . Since π is non negatively valued, π(φ) ≥ π(φ ∧ ψ) .
Definition for DmBL/DmBL * . In this case, we have to deal with independence notions. A probability P over DmBL/DmBL * is a IR + valued function, which verifies (replace ≡ C by ≡ and π by P ) equivalence, additivity, coherence, finiteness and:
for any proposition φ and ψ of L .
Probability extension over DmBL *
Property. Let π be a probability defined over C , the classical logic, such that π(φ) > 0 for any φ ≡ C ⊥. Then, there is a (multiplicative) probability P defined over DmBL * such that P (φ) = π(φ) for any classical proposition φ ∈ L C .
Remark: this is another non distortion property, since the construction of DmBL * puts no constraint over probabilistic classical propositions.
Proof is done in appendix C.
Corollary. Let π be a probability defined over C . Then, there is a probability P defined over DmBL * such that P (φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ L C .
Proof. Let Σ = θ∈Θ ǫ θ ǫ ∈ θ∈Θ {θ, ¬θ} . For any real number e > 0 , define then π e the probability over L C such that:
Let P e be the probability over DmBL * constructed from π e as defined in appendix C. By C.2.3 , there is a rational function R φ such that P e (φ) = R φ (e) for any φ ∈ L . Now 0 ≤ R φ (e) ≤ 1 ; since R φ (e) is rational and bounded, lim e→0+ R φ (e) exists. Define P (φ) = lim e→0+ R φ (e) , for any φ ∈ L. The additivity, coherence, finiteness and multiplicativity are obviously inherited by P . At last, it is clear that P (σ) = π(σ) for any σ ∈ Σ .
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Model and probability extension for DmBL
Let K be the set of all (multiplicative) probabilities P over DmBL * such that P (φ) > 0 for any φ ≡ ⊥ , and define the sequences
Since any P ∈ K verifies the equivalence property, it comes K(φ) = K(ψ) when φ ≡ ψ in DmBL * . As a direct consequence, L K , ¬, ∧, (|) is a conditional-like model of DmBL * (the structure is a Boolean algebra but not derived from set operators. that is the only difference with conditional models).
Proof. Let P ∈ K ; P is multiplicative.
Since ⊢ (ψ|φ) × φ and (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ ψ ∧ φ in DmBL * , it comes P (ψ|φ) P (φ) = P (ψ ∧ φ) .
, and P (ψ|φ) = P (ψ) for any P ∈ K . Then P (φ) = P (ψ∧φ)
P (ψ) = P (φ|ψ) for any P ∈ K , and K(φ) K(ψ) = K (φ|ψ) = K(φ) . Since moreover (φ|⊥) ≡ φ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ in DmBL * , the model verifies β6 .
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Notice that it was only needed the equivalence and multiplicative properties for the elements of K . It is thus possible to construct a more general model by relaxing K .
Probability extension. For any K(φ) ∈ L K and any P ∈ K , define the IR + -valued mappingP K(φ) = P (φ) (this mapping, a projection, is indeed well defined). By construction,P is naturally a multiplicative probability over L K . Moreover, the probabilistic extensions defined in appendix C are also elements of K . As a consequence, the deductions of section 5.2 are still working for L K . The extension property is thus derived:
Let π be a probability defined over C . Then, there is a probability P defined over DmBL such that P (φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ L C .
Non distortion. Let φ be a classical proposition. Assume that ⊢ 2φ ∨ 2¬φ in DmBL. Then ⊢ C φ or ⊢ C ¬φ.
Proof. Consider the Kripke model for DmBL derived from the conditional model L K , ¬, ∧, (|) .
In this model, the value of
It follows ∀P ∈ K , P (φ) = 1 or ∀P ∈ K , P (¬φ) = 1 , and by the probabilistic extension: ∀π , π(φ) = 1 or ∀π , π(¬φ) = 1 , where π is any probability over C . At last, ⊢ C φ or ⊢ C ¬φ .
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Properties of the conditional
Bayes inference. Assume a probability P defined over DmBL/DmBL * . Define P (ψ|φ) as an abbreviation for P (ψ|φ) . Then:
Proof. A consequence of (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ and ⊢ (ψ|φ) × φ .
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As a corollary, it is also deduced P (ψ|φ) (η|ζ) P (η|ζ) = P (ψ|φ) ∧ (η|ζ) . It is recalled that the closure of DGNW fails on this relation.
About Lewis' negative result.
The theorem. Lewis triviality may be expressed as follows: 
Then, it is inferred (with the notation ∼ B = Ω 0 \ B):
As a consequence, A and B are probabilistically independent for any possible choice of π such that 0 < π(B) < π(A) < 1 . This is impossible.
Discussion. What is refuted by Lewis is the hypothesis (B|A) ∈ M 0 , with ∅ B A Ω 0 . On the contrary, the hypotheses (∅|A)
and (C|A) ∈ M 0 for A ⊂ C, are not refuted by Lewis result itself, and may be used in the construction of conditional. This is an argument for removing trivial conditionings. Now, assume a model of DmBL to be constructed, and let M 0 be the Boolean algebra associated to the classical propositions (i.e. the unconditioned propositions). Our model should be compatible with any probability defined over the unconditioned propositions (this is a minimal requirement!) Lewis's triviality then make necessary the following hypothesis in the model construction: (B|A) ∈ M 0 for any A, B ∈ M 0 such that ∅ B A Ω 0 . Since DmBL implies (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ , it is inferred (ψ|φ) ≡ (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬φ ∧ (ψ|φ) and:
At last, a model of DmBL have to conform to: (Ω 0 \ A) ∩ (B|A) ∈ M 0 , for any A, B ∈ M 0 such that ∅ B A Ω 0 . A thorough look at case 1 of the model construction in section 4, clearly shows that our model is compliant with such condition. But it is noteworthy that the Product Space CEA is also compliant with it (refer to [16] or to appendix D). This condition is probably one of the keys for constructing a model for Bayesian.
And DmBL. . . The previous extension theorems has shown that for any probability π defined over C , it is possible to construct a probability P over DmBL which extends π . This result by itself shows that DmBL avoids Lewis triviality. The question is why? In fact the coexistence of Lewis and the extension theorem infers necessarily the following conditions:
• Define Q φ by Q φ (ψ) = P (ψ|φ) . Then Q φ is additive, coherent and finite , which makes it a probability in the classical meaning. But Q φ is not necessarily multiplicative .
•
Conversely, both conditions are sufficient for the coexistence of Lewis and the extension.
The last condition is the necessary construction condition, implied by the discussion. The first condition expresses a limitation of DmBL. This limitation is unavoidable: otherwise the derivation (1) is possible, even if (ψ|φ) is not equivalent to a classical proposition. Besides, assume φ ∈ L C and define the probability π φ over C by π φ (ψ) = π(φ ∧ ψ)/π(φ) . Let P φ be the extension of π φ over DmBL. Then P φ = Q φ .
Logical independence and probabilistic independence. The logical independence is a property stronger than the probabilistic independence. The independence ⊢ ψ × φ is equivalent to (ψ|φ) ≡ ψ . It is independent of the choice of a probability. In the probabilist paradigm, φ and ψ are said to be independent when P (ψ|φ) = P (ψ) . It is dependent of P . In particular, the condition σ ≡ ψ implies P (σ) = P (ψ) but the converse is false. The independence is a special case, where σ = (ψ|φ) .
The regularity property is a particular illustration of this difference:
Now, considering φ, ψ, η as measurable sets, the probabilistic independences P (φ ∩ η) = P (φ)P (η) , P (ψ ∩ η) = P (ψ)P (η) and the inclusion φ ∩ η ⊂ ψ ∩ η do not yield the inclusion φ ⊂ ψ in general, even when η = ∅.
Conclusion
In this contribution, a conditional logic, DmBL, has been defined and studied. This Logic is essentially different to the VCU of Lewis, since it implies a classical nature to the subuniverse. By the way, it shares common properties with notable Conditional Event Algebras. This logic has been proved to be coherent. A complete model has been defined for the propositions and the conditionals (not the modalities), in the case of the weakened logic DmBL * . It has been shown that any probability over the classical propositions could be extended to DmBL/DmBL * , in compliance with the independence relation. Then, the probabilistic Bayesian rule has been recovered from DmBL/DmBL * .
There are still many open questions. For example, it is certainly possible to bring some enrichment to the conditional of DmBL, by means of additional axioms. Is it possible to recover some specific equivalences of DGNW, or other CEA?
From a strictly logical viewpoint, the Deterministic modal Bayesian Logic has also some interesting properties. For example, the notion of independence in DmBL have some surprising logical consequences in the deductions (e.g. regularity with an inference). Is there a possible application in the constructions of theories?
At last it is recalled our first motivation, and this work will be applied in a next future to the logical comparison of the Bayesian with other theories of uncertain informations.
being assumed A, B, C ∈ Mn , and fn(·, ·) defined for the considered cases.
The proof is recursive and needs to consider the three cases in the definition of (µn, fn) .
The propertiesβ * are obvious for n = 0, since f0 is only defined by f ( A, ∅) = f0(A, Ω0) = A . From now on, it is assumed thatβ * hold true for k ≤ n, and that •µ and • f hold true for k ≤ n − 1 . The subsequent paragraphs establish the proof of β * for n + 1 and the proof of •µ and • f for n.
Preliminary remark. It is noticed thatβ2 andβ4 imply:
A.1 Lemma.
i∈In Πn(i) = bn and i∈In Γn(i) =∼ bn ; in particular, Πn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In . Moreover Πn(i) ∩ Πn(j) = Γn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In such that i = j .
Proof. The proof is obvious for case 1. Now, let consider case 0.
, ∼ bn) . By recursion hypothesis overβ1 it comes fn(∼ bn, ∼ bn) = Ωn . Then byβ2 , i∈In Πn(i) = bn ∩ Ωn = bn .
For any ω1, ω2 ∈ µν (bν) such that ω1 = ω2 , it comesβ7 byβ2,β4, and:
The results are similarly proved for Γn .
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Corollary 1.
Both corollary are obvious from the definition.
A.2 Proof of • µ
The following properties (whose proofs are immediate) will be useful:
Proof of µ n (Ω n ) = Ω n+1 and µ n (∅) = ∅ . Immediate from the definitions.
Proof of µ n (A ∩ B) = µ n (A) ∩ µ n (B) . By applying ℓ2, it is deduced:
By lemma A.1, and applying ℓ3 and ℓ4, it is deduced:
µ n is one-to-one. Assume µn(A) = µn(B) ; then:
By lemma A.1, and applying ℓ2, ℓ3 and ℓ5, it is deduced for any i ∈ In : 
Conclusion.
The previous results imply that µn is a one-to-one Boolean morphism.
A.3 Proof of • f
By definition, the result holds true for any A ∈ Mn \ {∅, Ωn, bn, ∼ bn} . It is also true for A = ∅ or A = Ωn , since fn+1 µn(B), µn(∅) = fn+1 µn(B), ∅ = µn(B) = µn fn(B, ∅) and similarly fn+1 µn(B), µn(Ωn) = fn+1 µn(B), Ωn+1 = µn(B) = µn fn(B, Ωn) .
The true difficulties come from the cases A = bn or A =∼ bn . Subsequently, it is assumed A = bn ; the case A =∼ bn is quite similar. It comes:
The existence of fn(B, bn) necessary implies the case 0 , and there is C ∈ Mν+1 such that B = C [n] . By recursion hypotheses
As a consequence i∈In B ∩ Πn(i) × Γn(i) = i∈In Πn(i) × fn(B, bn) ∩ Γn(i) .
for any ω ∈ µν (bν) .
As a consequence i∈In B ∩ Πn(i) × Γn(i) = i∈In fn(B, bn) ∩ Πn(i) × Γn(i) . By applying the both results, it comes:
And by definition, fn+1 µn(B), µn(bn) = µn fn+1(B, bn) .
A.4 Proof ofβ1
For A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn), ∅, Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying • f . The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅, Ωn+1} . The difficulty comes from A = µn(bn) or A =∼ µn(bn) ; then notice that A = ∅ by construction.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) and µn(bn) ⊂ B ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
Then T µn(bn) ⊂ T (B) and by lemma, corollary 1&2:
A.5 Proof ofβ2
For A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn), ∅, Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying • f . The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅, Ωn+1} . The property is then immediate for A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn)} , since
A.6 Proof ofβ3
For A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn), ∅, Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying • f . The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅, Ωn+1} . The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn)}.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar. The result is immediate from corollary 2 of lemma.
A.7 Proof ofβ4
For A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn), ∅, Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying • f . The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅, Ωn+1} . The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn), ∼ µn(bn)} .
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1 ∼ B, µn(bn) = µn(bn) \ B ∪ ∼ µn(bn) \ T (B) .
A.8 Lemma 2.
Let C ∈ Mn+1 . Then: fn+1 fn+1 C, µn(bn) , µn(bn) = fn+1 fn+1 C, µn(bn) , ∼ µn(bn) = fn+1 C, µn(bn) and fn+1 fn+1 C, ∼ µn(bn) , µn(bn) = fn+1 fn+1 C, ∼ µn(bn) , ∼ µn(bn) = fn+1 C, ∼ µn(bn) .
Proof. The result is derived for fn+1 C, µn(bn) ; it is quite similar for fn+1 C, ∼ µn(bn) .
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1 C, µn(bn) = C ∩ µn(bn) ∪ T (C)∩ ∼ µn(bn) .
Since T fn+1 C, µn(bn) = fn+1 C, µn(bn) by definition, the proof is done by corollary 2.
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Corollary. As a direct consequence, fn+1 fn+1(B, A), A = fn+1 fn+1(B, A), ∼ A = fn+1(B, A) , whenever fn+1(B, A) exists.
A.9 Proof ofβ6w
Assume fn+1(B, A) and fn+1(B, ∼ A) exist and fn+1(B, A) = B .
By lemma 2, fn+1(B, ∼ A) = fn+1 fn+1(B, A), ∼ A = fn+1(B, A) = B .
B Proof: partial completeness
To be proved:
Let φ ∈ L be constructed without 2 or 3 . Then ⊢ φ in DmBL * if and only if HB(φ) = Ω∞ .
From now on, let L b = φ ∈ L / φ is constructed without 2 or 3 . In fact, it will be proved:
where (L b )≡ is the set of equivalence classes of L b and (HB)≡ is inferred from HB .
The proof is based on a recursive construction of L b similar to the definition of M∞ .
Construction. Assume the sequence (Ωn, Mn, hn, fn, Λn)n∈IN being constructed.
The sequence (Ln)n∈IN is defined by:
is the set generated by Ln, the classical operators, the conditionals (·|φ) where φ ∈ Ln and HB(φ) = bn .
The set Σn ⊂ (Ln)≡ is defined as the generating partition of Ln, that is ∀φ ∈ (Ln)≡ , ∃S ⊂ Σn , σ∈S σ = φ and σ ∧ σ ′ = ⊥ for any σ, σ ′ ∈ Σn such that σ = σ ′ .
The following property is proved in next paragraph:
Since (HB)≡ is by construction an onto morphism from (Ln)≡ to Mn:∞ , (3) implies that (HB)≡ is a Boolean isomorphism between (Ln)≡ and Mn:∞ . These isomorphisms and the cyclic definition of Λn then imply L b = ∪n∈IN(Ln) . As a conclusion, (2) is deduced.
Proof of (3) for n = 0. It is obvious, since (M0:∞, HB) is a complete model for LC .
True for n implies true for n + 1.
The recursion hypothesis implies that (HB)≡ is an isomorphism between (Ln)≡ and Mn:∞ . Define then βn ∈ (Ln)≡ such that (HB)≡(βn) = bn .
It is known that (·|βn) ¬βn = (·|βn) and (·|¬βn) βn = (·|¬βn) .
Then, since sub-universes are classical,
Now, denote Bn = σ ∈ Σn σ ∧ βn = σ and Bn = σ ∈ Σn σ ∧ ¬βn = σ .
It comes that (σ ′ |βn) = (σ ′′ |¬βn) = ⊥ for σ ′ ∈ Bn and σ ′′ ∈ Bn . Moreover σ ∧ (σ ′ |βn) ∧ (σ ′′ |¬βn) = ⊥ for σ ∈ {σ ′ , σ ′′ } ; in particular σ ∧ (σ|βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn , and σ ∧ (σ|¬βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn .
Then, the two cases are considered:
′ ∧ (σ|βn) , owing to above discussion; then:
Case 0. In this case, βn = βν .
Define Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ βν = σ} and Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ ¬βν = σ} . Define also D[φ] = {σ ∈ Σn/σ ∧ φ = σ} for any φ ∈ (Lν+1)≡ .
From previously, it is know that Σn+1 contains elements of the form σ ∧ (σ ′ |¬βn) or σ ′ ∧ (σ|βn) with (σ, σ ′ ) ∈ Bn × Bn ; but construction at step ν + 1 implies additional constraints, to be specified.
Let consider especially the case σ ∧ (σ ′ |¬βn); case σ ′ ∧ (σ|βn) is quite similar. Noticed that there is (τσ, τ
; similarly the case
= i∈In 2 card Πn(i) card Γn(i) = card(Ωn+1) .
C Probability construction
Let π be a probability defined over C , such that π(φ) > 0 for any φ ≡C ⊥. Then, there is a (multiplicative) probability P defined over DmBL * such that ∀φ ∈ LC , P (φ) = π(φ) .
The construction is a recursion based on the definition of B .
C.1 Construction
The probabilities Pn|n∈IN are defined over Mn:∞ by:
Pn {ω}∞ for any A ∈ Mn , and:
Initialization.
For ω = δ θ | θ∈Θ ∈ Ω0 and τ ∈ Θ, define τω = τ if δτ = 1 and τω = ¬τ if δτ = 0 .
Then set P0 ω∞ = π θ∈Θ θω for any ω ∈ Ω0 , From n to n+1. For any (ω, ω
An example of construction is given in appendix D.
Notation. For m ≤ n and A ∈ Mm, the probability Pn(A∞) is denoted Pn(A) for simplicity.
C.2 Properties.
and then:
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Corollary. Pn(Ω∞) = 1 .
Derived from P0(Ω∞) = π(⊤) = 1 which is obvious.
Corollary of the corollary. Pn is indeed a probability in the classical meaning.
Additivity, coherence are obtained by construction. Finiteness comes from the corollary.
These propositions are proved recursively.
Proof of 1. Obvious in case 1; the difficulty arises for case 0.
Assume now case 0, and let (ω, ω ′ ) ∈ In , i.e. ω ∈ µν (bν) and ω ′ ∈∼ µν (bν ).
Then
Pn f ν+1 ω ′ ,∼µν (bν ) ∩ω
, by the recursion hypothesis over 2, and finally
Pn Πn(i)
Pn(bn)
= Pn fν+1 ω ′ , ∼ µν (bν) ∩ fν+1 ω, µν (bν) .
Similarly, it is derived
Pn Γn(i)
Pn(∼bn)
= Pn fν+1 ω ′ , ∼ µν(bν ) ∩ fν+1 ω, µν (bν) .
Then
Pn ( Proof of 3. Similar to 2.
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C.2.3 Conclusion.
Define P∞ = n∈IN Pn , that is ∀A ∈ Mn:∞ , P∞(A) = Pn(A) . By inheritance from Pn, P∞ is a probability over M∞, which verifies the property:
P∞(A ∩ B) = P∞(A)P∞ f∞(B, A) , for any A ∈ M∞ .
Define P (φ) = P∞ HB(φ) Since B is a model of DmBL, it is clear that the additivity, coherence and finiteness are inherited from P∞ . Now, it is noticed that ⊢ φ × ψ is equivalent to (ψ|φ) ≡ ψ . It is then implied:
P (φ∧ψ) = P∞ HB(φ)∩HB(ψ) = P∞ HB(φ) P∞ f∞ HB(ψ), HB(φ) = P∞ HB(φ) P∞ HB(ψ) .
Finally, P verifies the multiplicativity.
P is a probability over DmBL * .
Rational structure of P . Let Σ = θ∈Θ ǫ θ ǫ ∈ θ∈Θ {θ, ¬θ} . For any φ ∈ L , there is a rational function R φ : IR (2 Θ ) → IR such that P (φ) = R φ π(σ)|σ∈Σ .
The proof is obvious from the construction.
D Conditional model: construction and comparison
First step construction (examples). In this paragraph, the objects Ω k , f k , Λ k , µ k−1 | k=0,1 , i.e. one iteration, are explicitly constructed, as well as the associated probability extensions P0, P1 (c.f. appendix C). It is assumed that Ω0 = {a, b, c} . This hypothesis cannot hold actually, but the case is sufficiently simple to be handled, and sufficiently complex to be illustrative. By the way, only the case 1 of the construction is considered. Case 0 is intractable in a true example.
In the sequel, the list Λn is represented by the sequence λn(k)| fn−1 k=sn . For simplicity, µ k (A) and A will be identified. and Λ1 = {b, c}, a, {c, a}, b + P(Ω1) \ P(Ω0) + {a, b}, c .
Comparison with the Product Space CEA. The conditional of PSCEA [16] is defined by:
where X and S are unconditioned propositions and U is the universe. As a consequence, (S|X) = (S ∩ X) × U × . . . ∪ X c × (S|X) .
By identifying X with X × U × U . . ., as suggested by [16] , the PSCEA appears as a fix point for the equation (S|X) = (S ∩ X) ∪ X c × (S|X) .
Let compare this result with the case 1 of the model construction of DmBL * (the case 0 is just a constrained version of case 1, accordingly to the logical rules of DmBL * ). Assuming A ∈ Mn, it comes fn+1 µn(A), µn(bn) = µn(A) ∩ µn(bn) ∪ ∼ bn × (A ∩ bn) and ∼ µn(bn) ∩ fn+1 µn(A), µn(bn) =∼ bn × (A ∩ bn) .
Finally, it is deduced fn+1 µn(A), µn(bn) = µn(A)∩µn(bn) ∪ ∼ µn(bn)∩fn+1 µn(A), µn(bn) .
By the way, it is recognized in both cases the logical fix point (ψ|φ) = (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬φ ∩ (ψ|φ) .
Nevertheless, the similitude is limited. In the case of PSCEA, the fix point is defined globally for any X simultaneously. In the case of DmBL * , the iterations are individual (i.e. related to bn and ∼ bn); moreover, the conditional of DmBL * is defined for any propositions.
Then although a true comparison of PSCEA with DmBL needs a dedicated work, it seems possible to state that PSCEA is somewhat more constrained than DmBL * (i.e. DmBL * is likely to specify the unconditioned level less than PSCEA). In particular, the logical independence, specific to DmBL * , will not infer significant consequences over the unconditioned level, as it is shown subsequently.
Logical independence and unconditional propositions. It is seen that there is a slight difference, since DmBL * considers the case of empty conditioning: whatever, it has been seen that the behavior of DmBL * was quite specific regarding to (·|⊥). But essentially, both theories reduces the logical independence between unconditioned propositions to trivial cases.
As a conclusion, the notion of logical independence does not change the status of the unconditioned propositions: there is not a significant difference between DmBL * and PSCEA at the unconditioned level about this notion.
